

Mathematical Disruption and Impact Models for Addressing Regional Resilience

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Recent Disasters

Natural Hazards



Manmade Events

Many Interconnected Elements




Critical Infrastructure Systems

- 16 Critical Infrastructure sectors in United States
- Primarily owned/operated by private sector
- Increasingly interconnected (physical and cyber)
- Operate in an all-hazards environment
- Regulated and non-regulated

- Agriculture and Food
- Banking and Finance
- Chemical
- Commercial Facilities
- Communications
- Critical Manufacturing
- Dams
- Defense Industrial Base
- Emergency Services

- Energy
- Government Facilities
- Healthcare and Public Health
- Information Technology
- Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
- Transportation Systems
- Water

Complex linkages among Critical Infrastructure



Enhance Resilience




Ability of an entity (e.g., asset, organization, community, region) to **anticipate**, **resist**, **absorb**, **respond to**, **adapt to**, and **recover** from a disturbance



Understand Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies

	10	SUPPORTING SECTOR														
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
Regional Resilience Framework



EPfast

- Assess the potential electric power outage impacts on a particular facility or region of concern following disruptions to infrastructure components
- Multiple simulation modes (e.g., load flow, islanding analysis, or network connectivity analysis) allow the user to evaluate the system and conduct meaningful "what-if" scenarios

EPfast



Transmission Lines at Risk

(Portante et al., 2011)

NGfast

- Quantify the impacts of manmade or natural disasters on natural gas systems, specifically those due to pipeline breaks or loss of pressure
- Linear model that uses a progressive forward pipeline ownership identification and flow quantification process to track lost flow volumes

NGfast




Name:	NJ														
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Flow Out (MMcfD):		8.5639													
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Power Plants: [Back to Summary Page] - [Bac															

Restore[©]

- Models complex sets of steps required to accomplish a goal when the time required to complete a repair or the steps needed to repair or replace may be uncertain
- Runs Monte Carlo simulations using transition diagrams to define probability distribution that captures the uncertainty in the time required to complete a step

Restore[©]



EPfast, NGfast, and Restore©

 Use in tandem to provide a more holistic picture of infrastructure resilience

 Provide insight on a small portion of regional resilience but constitute an important step to understand impacts of disruption of critical infrastructure systems

Summary

<u>WHY</u>

- Experience from recent disasters
- Consideration of many interconnected elements

<u>WHAT</u>

- Improve overall understanding of Critical Infrastructure Systems
- Lay the foundation for enhanced resilience

HOW

- Develop a **Regional Resilience Framework** combining tools and indices
- Use of mathematical tools EPfast, NGfast, and Restore©